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Introduction  
The Irish referendum on the European Union's Lisbon Treaty, held on 12 June 2008, 
produced a negative outcome with the measure being rejected by the electorate by a 
margin of almost 54 per cent to 46 per cent. Thus for the second time in seven years 
Irish citizens declined to support a Treaty which their political elites overwhelmingly 
endorsed. The result plunged the European Union into yet another crisis, the latest 
following the rejection of the earlier Constitutional Treaty in referendums in France 
and the Netherlands in 2005. This article analyses the Irish referendum, the main 
actors and issues which influenced the campaign, and the reasons for the No vote. It 
argues that the two most significant phenomena which explain the result are the 
attachment of the Irish people to a particularistic conception of Irish identity 
combined with a lack of knowledge about both the EU decision-making system and 
the content of the Lisbon Treaty itself.  
 
Actors and Issues  
On the Yes side stood the Republic's dominant political party, Fianna Fáil, as well as 
the two largest opposition parties, Fine Gael and Labour, and Fianna Fáil's small 
coalition partner, the Progressive Democrats1. On the No side many of the party 
political actors were familiar from previous referendums on EU issues. Sinn Féin has 
been actively opposed to European integration since the 1972 referendum (though it 
professes itself to be a pro-European party). The Socialist Party, the Socialist Workers 
Party and the Communist Party of Ireland also campaigned against the Treaty whilst 
independent Eurosceptic politicians such as MEP Kathy Sinnott and former MEP 
Dana Rosemary Scallon gave added voice to the opposition campaign.  
 
So if these were the main actors active during the campaign what were the key issues 
which framed the debate? The first was the institutional re-calibration which included 
changes to the structure of the Commission and the modus operandi of the Council of 
Ministers. Essentially these arguments were about Ireland's voice and institutional 
representation in Brussels and the changes wrought by the Lisbon Treaty relative to 
the status quo. The No side argued that the legitimacy of the EU depended on full and 
equal representation of all member states in the decision-making structures. The right 
of each state to a seat at the Commission table at all times was thus sacrosanct. The 
loss of a commissioner for one term in three, effectively five years out of every fifteen, 
was presented by the No side as a significant further loss of sovereignty and influence 
for Ireland with no compensating 'side payments' offered within the broader 
institutional matrix. Public opinion, analysed both during and after the campaign, 
demonstrated a strong attachment to the idea of a permanent Irish commissioner and 
in this sense the No argument was certainly very successful.  
 
The issue of an emerging European defence and security policy has featured strongly 
in Ireland's European debates since at least the Maastricht Treaty and was again a 
significant concern among voters in the 2008 poll. A number of political parties, 
including Sinn Féin, along with a range of civil society groups coalesced around this 
theme and argued that Irish neutrality had been steadily eroded by successive treaties 
and by membership of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), and would be further 
compromised by Lisbon. In effect the No side sought to paint a picture of 
untrammelled 'movement' in the area of defence and security policy, especially with 
the introduction of a so-called European Army - the Rapid Reaction Force - which 
would be equipped with aircraft carriers, Patriot cruise missiles, fighter aircraft and all 
the standard features of an aggressive military power bent on adventurism. The 
Government could not be trusted to protect neutrality and indeed was suspected of 
colluding with other EU member states in the 'creeping militarisation' of the EU.  
 
From the beginning of the campaign, issues related to Ireland's place within the 
European and global economy featured strongly. The protection of Ireland's corporate 
tax regime assumed a central place in the campaign of those on the right of the 
political spectrum who placed the alleged threat to Ireland's corporate tax rate at the 
centre of their campaign. Asserting that the mainstream political parties could not be 
trusted on the tax issue, the right argued that Ireland's strategy should be to seek 
something stronger than the veto, namely a legally binding protocol which would 
guarantee absolute independence to set national tax policy. With fiscal autonomy 
constrained by Ireland's membership of the Eurozone, tax policy was presented as the 
key contemporary instrument of sovereign economic power. In an economy plunging 
into recession and amidst a growing popular consciousness of latent economic 
fragility, these arguments received a serious hearing. In marked contrast, the left 
critique of the European integration process focused on the alleged neoliberal bias of 
the European Commission and the ongoing attacks on 'Social Europe' by the 
European Commission, corporate Europe and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). A 
particular target of attack was the ECJ, which despite its record of robust 
interventionism on the side of workers rights, was routinely presented as a friend of 
the market rather than the worker: "the court's decisions are sustained attacks on the 
wages and working conditions of workers throughout the EU" according to Roger 
Cole of the Peace and Neutrality Alliance. The ECJ was continually interpreting the 
treaties in a way which favoured 'competition' over labour and local collective 
bargaining arrangements. In particular the Laval and Viking judgements featured 
strongly in No arguments, as 'evidence' of ECJ perfidy. Thus the Lisbon Treaty was 
the subject of attacks from both the left and right of the political spectrum, a 
phenomenon also clearly present in the 2005 referendums in France and the 
Netherlands.  
 
The referendum result: Ireland votes No to Lisbon  
On a turnout of 53.13% the proposed constitutional amendment was defeated by 
53.4% to 46.6%. So what factors explain the outcome? The first striking behavioural 
aspect of the outcome was the turnout. Prior to Lisbon most commentators expected 
that the higher the turnout the more likely it was that the Yes side would prevail. But 
the Lisbon referendum, although producing a significantly high turnout, did not see 
this pattern repeated, as most additional voters seem to have voted against the Treaty. 
Turning to a more sociological approach to the profile of Yes and No voters, a 
number of issues arise. The Eurobarometer survey shows that the main supporters of 
the Treaty were indeed to be found in the higher occupational classes: senior 
managers (66%), the 'self-employed' (60%), professionals (58%), and those with 
higher levels of education (57%)2. On the other hand blue collar voters were largely 
supportive of the No vote, especially those members of trade unions such as UNITE 
and the TEEU which urged their members to vote No. So a distinct social class 
cleavage was very much in evidence. Other factors such as age, gender and geography 
also help to explain some aspects of the vote.  
 
If this data provides valuable information about electoral behaviour there are two 
substantive issues which help us to contextualise that behaviour. The first is the way 
in which Irish conceptions of identity may have influenced voters' perceptions of the 
Lisbon Treaty and Ireland's place in the integration process. Voters testified that a 
major reason for voting No was to 'keep Ireland's power and identity'. During the 
course of the campaign this impulse toward a 'sovereigntist' position increased, from 
16 to 24%. John Coakley argues that, notwithstanding the strong currents of support 
for European integration, Ireland's enduring attachment to nationalist values should 
not be under-estimated: "a history of vigorous nationalist agitation, a tradition of 
suspecting powerful neighbours and a long-standing emphasis on national sovereignty 
have been outstandingly characteristic of Irish political culture"3. Fully 12% of 
respondents to the Eurobarometer survey voted No to "protect Irish identity" (the 
second most important reason for voting No), suggesting that the identity dimension 
emerges as crucial in explaining the outcome. At the very least this suggests that the 
'European' layer of Irish identity is in reality so thin that the consistently high 
professions of support for the EU in opinion polls may now be considered highly 
suspect. Where that support has been tested at the ballot box, two out of the last three 
popular votes have produced anti-integrationist outcomes.  
 
The second substantive issue with a bearing on the outcome concerns voters' 
knowledge about the Treaty and the EU more generally. A considerable body of data 
accumulated during previous referendums and from Eurobarometer tracking polls 
demonstrates that, although the Irish remain amongst the most enthusiastic about EU 
membership, there remains a significant knowledge vacuum, with a large majority of 
citizens professing to know little or nothing about how decisions are made at EU level 
and how the EU institutions function. Eurobarometer polls consistently demonstrate 
that support for the EU is related to relative levels of knowledge. Support for the 
Treaty dropped to 39% among those who were only vaguely aware of the issues and 
to a mere 10% amongst the two in five voters who said they did not know what the 
treaty was all about4. The post-referendum Eurobarometer survey confirmed that once 
again lack of knowledge constituted the most important reason for not voting (22%)5. 
Further data support this statistic: fully one fifth of No voters and one sixth of Yes 
voters did not know if the Lisbon Treaty would be good or bad for Ireland6.  
 
The significance of the knowledge vacuum is particularly evident in the strategies 
adopted by the No side in particular. Two specific phenomena can be identified. First, 
the No campaign centred on short, sharp messages easily understood, which provided 
voters with easy to process (negative) images of the EU and the Lisbon Treaty, in 
contrast to the Yes messages which invariably came across as complex if not tortured 
(the EU as an abstract and variegated public good). Second, the No side demonstrated 
an ability and willingness to distort and misrepresent both the content of the Lisbon 
Treaty and the nature of the European integration process. There are multiple 
examples that can be offered in evidence. No campaigners argued that under Lisbon 
Ireland would lose a commissioner, without pointing out that every other EU state 
would also lose a commissioner for one term in three. They continually argued that 
Irish influence in Brussels would be reduced because of the changes to Ireland's 
voting weight in Council, without acknowledging the new rules on population size 
and majoritarian principles which favoured small states. A particularly egregious 
misrepresentation concerned Article 113 on taxation, which many components of the 
No side argued would mean that Ireland's veto on corporate taxation would be 
eliminated. In fact Article 113 applies only to indirect taxation, but this did not stop 
the lie being perpetrated on a wide-ranging basis. Finally, No campaigners repeatedly 
used an alleged quote from Giscard d'Estaing, the former French President and Chair 
of the Convention which paved the way for the European Constitution. Giscard was 
outrageously misquoted: "Public opinion will be led to adopt, without knowing it, the 
proposals that we dare not present to them directly... All the earlier proposals will be 
in the new text, but will be hidden and disguised in some way... What was already 
difficult to understand will become utterly incomprehensible, but the substance has 
been retained"7. The quote was taken from an article penned by Giscard in Le Monde 
on 15 June 2007. In fact Giscard was arguing against any recycling of the 
Constitutional Treaty and specifically warning about the backlash that this would 
produce. And he was referring exclusively to France and not any other EU member 
states. He was emphatic in describing the use of the quotation out of context by Irish 
No campaigners as "extremely dishonest"8. It seems instructive that not a single Irish 
journalist or media outlet bothered to chase down and translate the Le Monde even 
after it began to be used extensively by No campaigners. Partly this might reflect the 
new prominence within the Irish media market of Eurosceptic British news 
organizations such as Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation and the Mail Group. But it 
also reflects very poorly on the capacity and willingness of the Irish media to 
adequately scrutinise the claims made by prominent actors in the referendum 
campaign.  
 
Conclusion  
The rejection of the Lisbon Treaty plunged Ireland into a profound political crisis, not 
least because EU leaders indicated an unwillingness to re-negotiate any part of the 
Treaty: it would be up to Ireland to find an Irish solution to this European problem. 
Coinciding with this impasse in Irish-EU relations, an economic recession began to 
present serious difficulties as the public finances deteriorated to their worst state in 25 
years, thus presenting Brian Cowen's government with the most challenging set of 
circumstances in which to think about moving forward. The Irish rejection of Lisbon 
also led directly to ratification problems in other member states, as procedures were 
set in motion by Euro-sceptic actors in the Czech Republic, Poland and other states to 
legally challenge domestic ratification processes. It also dealt a serious blow to the 
incoming French Presidency of the EU, and it was not long before President Nicholas 
Sarkozy was disabused of any notion that a specifically Irish solution (a second 
referendum) could be found to the ratification problem, at least in the short term9.  
 
The outcome of the referendum may seem paradoxical to some, in that Eurobarometer 
opinion polls of attitudes to the EU continue to demonstrate that Irish people are 
strong supporters of the integration process. In June 2008, 78% of Irish people 
believed Irish membership of the European Union to be a good thing, 80% believed 
that Ireland has benefited from EU membership and 77% had a positive image of the 
EU (far more than the EU average of 48%). The problem is that these favourable 
attitudes vary considerably in intensity. It seems clear from the post-referendum data 
that the pro-European side manifestly failed to provide voters with either normative or 
utilitarian reasons to endorse the Treaty. The 'soft bloc' of support for European 
integration crumbled in the face of a vigorous No campaign and a lack of confidence 
among citizens in their ability to understand both the content of the Lisbon Treaty and 
the nature of EU decision-making processes.  
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